Adding Support for the Custom Kernel Module Integrity Checks #1777
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Add support for custom kernel module integrity verification at boot
This PR introduces a mechanism to verify the integrity of custom kernel modules at boot time. The change addresses a security concern where Flatcar currently does not check custom modules for tampering or unauthorized modifications, leaving potential room for malicious code injection.
The implementation uses a signed list of approved kernel module hashes. During boot, each custom module is checked against this list. If a mismatch is found or the module is not recognized, the system can block the module or issue a warning, depending on configuration. This adds a layer of integrity and trust to customized Flatcar deployments.
How to use
To test this feature:
scripts/module-integrity/generate-signed-hashlist.sh)./etc/modules/trusted/).Testing done
I manually tested this on a Flatcar development VM:
Example: